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Workers Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld) ss 131 
and 237(1) -  alternative rights against employer at common law or  
statutory - invalid application for compensation lodged – whether 
worker precluded from seeking common law damages  
 
In Jacobs v Woolworths Limited [2010] QSC 24 Jones J was required to 
determine whether a worker who had lodged an application for 
compensation for an injury outside the time prescribed under the 
Workers Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld) (“the Act”) 
was precluded from seeking common law damages for that injury.  
 
This determination depended upon the proper construction of s 131 of 
the Act, and what was to be understood by the words “worker who has 
not lodged an application for compensation for the injury” for the purpose 
of s 237(1)(d). 
 
Facts 
 
The applicant alleged that she sustained an injury in the course of her 
employment with the respondent between December 2006 and March 
2009. On 10 September 2009, she served on the respondent a Notice of 
Claim for Damages for that injury under s 275 of the Workers’ 
Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld) (“the Act”). 
 
The respondent company was a self-insurer. It refused to accept the 
Notice of Claim on the basis that the applicant was not entitled to seek 
damages because she was not a person mentioned in s 237 of the Act. 
That section restricts the entitlement to claim damages for a work related 
injury to certain nominated classes of workers. 
 
In this proceeding the applicant sought a declaration that she was 
entitled to seek damages for her alleged injury. The issue arose because 
the applicant had earlier lodged an application for statutory 
compensation which the respondent rejected on the grounds that it was 
lodged out of time under s 131(1) of the Act, and the respondent refused 
to waive compliance.  
 
The applicant had sought a review of that decision by the Workers’ 
Compensation Regulatory Authority (“the Authority”) under Chapter 13 of 
the Act. That review remained to be determined, and it remained a 
fallback position for the applicant if her application for the declaration 
was unsuccessful. 
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Legislation 
 
The Act does not define the term “application for compensation.” 
 
Section 131 of the Act provides, so far as relevant:  
 
131 Time for applying 
 
(1) An application for compensation is valid and enforceable only if 
the application is lodged by the claimant within 6 months after the 
entitlement to compensation arises. 
 
(2) If an application is lodged more than 20 business days after the 
entitlement to compensation arises, the extent of the insurer’s 
liability to pay compensation is limited to a period starting no 
earlier than 20 business days before the day on which the valid 
application is lodged.” 
… 
 
Section 132 sets out a number of other requirements in relation to an 
application for compensation. Section 134 prescribes how the 
application is to be dealt with by the insurer. 
 
Section 237(1) abolishes the right of an injured worker to claim 
compensation damages for a work related injury unless the worker falls 
within one of the particular exceptions identified in s 237(1). That section 
provides, so far as relevant- 
 
“237 General limitation on persons entitled to seek damages 
 
(1) The following are the only persons entitled to seek damages for 
an injury sustained by a worker – 
… 
(c) the worker, if – 
(i) the worker has lodged an application, for compensation for the 
injury, that is or has been the subject of a review or appeal under 
chapter 13; and 
(ii) the application has not been decided in or following the review 
or appeal; or 
(d) the worker, if the worker has not lodged an application for 
compensation for the injury; and 
… 
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Submissions 
 
It was submitted for the applicant that the reference in paragraph (d) of s 
237(1) to the “application for compensation” necessarily invited a 
consideration of the terminology in s 131, particularly the emphasis that 
the application for compensation is valid and enforceable only if the 
application is lodged within the stated time.  
 
Accepting for the purpose of deciding the issue before the court that the 
application was not within time, as asserted by the respondent, the 
application was never valid and enforceable. Unless its invalidity was 
waived, its lodgement was a nullity. This argument was supported by the 
decision of Helman J in Thompson v WorkCover Queensland [2002] 1 
QdR 461 in relation to corresponding provisions under the repealed 
Workcover Queensland Act 1996 (Qld). 
 
The respondent contended that the mere physical act of lodging an 
application for compensation, however flawed or ineffective the 
application may be, precluded the worker from later pursuing a claim for 
damages.  
 
The respondent referred to a number of decisions which it argued 
provided some indication that the physical act of lodgement was the 
critical factor: Kelly v WorkCover Queensland [2002] 1 QdR 496; Watkin 
v GRM International Pty Ltd [2007] 1 QdR 389; Charlton v WorkCover 
Queensland [2007] 2 QdR 421. 
 
Analysis 
 
Jones J first considered the cases referred to in the submissions for the 
parties. His Honour noted, in particular, that the cases relied upon by the 
respondent did not focus directly on the question of the proper 
construction of the relevant provisions. Accordingly, he did not regard 
them as providing any binding interpretation of the proper construction of 
s 237(1)(d).  
 
His Honour turned to consider in detail the terms of the legislation.  
 
He regarded the emphatic words in s 131, by which the application is 
valid and enforceable ‘‘only if” the application is lodged within the 
prescribed time, as suggesting that an application lodged otherwise had 
no validity.  
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He also noted that there was a discretionary power in the insurer, in 
limited circumstances, to waive invalidity for a “particular application”, 
with the Authority having the power, under chapter 13 of the Act, to 
review that decision (s 540(1)(a)(vii) and (1)(b)(i)).  
 
A review of a failure by Workcover or an insurer to make a decision at all 
was available only where the application for compensation was within 
time (s 540(1)(c)(i)).  
 
In his Honour’s view these considerations also placed emphasis upon 
the validity of the application rather than the act of lodgement. 
 
Jones J then referred to authority to the effect that legislative provisions 
must be read in the context of the statute as a whole, and with due 
regard to the general purpose and policy of a provision and its 
consistency and fairness: Cooper Brookes (Wollongong Pty Ltd v 
Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1981) 147 CLR 297; Project Blue 
Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority [1998] 194 CLR 355; 
Commissioner for Railways (NSW) v Agalianos (1995) 92 CLR 390 at 
397 per Dixon CJ.  
 
His Honour examined in some detail the framework of the Act, and the 
various processes available for a worker to seek damages under it. He 
concluded (at [22]-[23]): 
 The construction urged by the respondent - that the lodgement of 
an out of time application would preclude a later claim for damages 
- would mean that all of the gateways to making a claim for 
damages would be closed to such a claimant without there having 
been any inquiry as to the relationship between the worker’s injury 
and his/her work. 
By contrast if, as the applicant contends, the reference to 
application for compensation is restricted to a valid application, it 
would initiate the inquiry and assessment contemplated by the 
statute. On this approach s 237(1) would achieve its full scope. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The conclusion was that the applicant should be regarded as a worker 
who had not lodged an application for compensation within the meaning 
of s 237(1)(d) and that she was entitled to a declaration to that effect. 
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Comment 
The interpretation of s 131 adopted in this case means that workers may 
be advised in appropriate circumstances to lodge an application for 
compensation out of time on the basis that the insurer may waive the out 
of time status and the worker might yet receive the benefit of statutory 
compensation.  
 
As Jones J observed in the course of his judgment, the alternative 
construction, by which a damages claim could be precluded by the mere 
act of lodgement, would render ineffective those provisions of the Act 
designed to encourage the lodgement of an application notwithstanding 
its invalidity by allowing that invalidity to be waived.  
 
